Putting Olmstead To Work: Toward A Less Segregated Workplace by Lane, Alexander
University of Minnesota Law School 
Scholarship Repository 
Journal of Inequality Inquiry 
2019 
Putting Olmstead To Work: Toward A Less Segregated Workplace 
Alexander Lane 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/jii 
Recommended Citation 
Lane, Alexander, "Putting Olmstead To Work: Toward A Less Segregated Workplace" (2019). Journal of 
Inequality Inquiry. 3. 
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/jii/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Inequality Inquiry collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu. 
1 
PUTTING OLMSTEAD TO WORK: 
TOWARD A LESS SEGREGATED 
WORKPLACE 
Alexander Lane† 
Today, across the United States of America, hundreds of 
thousands of people with disabilities are being isolated and 
financially exploited by their employers. Many are segregated 
away from traditional work and kept out of sight . . . .For many 
people with disabilities, their dream of leaving their ‘job 
training program’ will never come true. They labor away 
making only a tiny portion of what they should because there is 
a system in place that provides no true alternatives. 
– Curtis L. Decker, Esq., Executive Director of the National 
Disability Rights Network 1 
I. Introduction 
At the Harold V. Birch Vocational Academy, “a Providence 
high school where students with intellectual disabilities 
participated in an in-school sheltered workshop, separated from 
their non-disabled peers,” Jerry D’Agostino worked to sort, 
assemble, and package jewelry and buttons.2 At the Academy, Jerry 
earned well below minimum wage until graduating in 2010.3 
Thereafter, Jerry continued to perform this “benchwork” at another 
sheltered workshop—Goodwill Industries.4 Jerry felt this work was 
 
 †. J.D. Candidate, University of Minnesota Law School, 2019; B.A., Western 
Washington University, 2016. Alexander would like to thank the staff and editors of 
Law & Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice, in particular Alicia Granse, for 
their help in preparing this Article for publication. Alexander would also like to 
thank his family for their constant support and encouragement. 
 1. NAT’L DISABILITY RIGHTS NETWORK, SEGREGATED AND EXPLOITED: THE 
FAILURE OF THE DISABILITY SERVICE SYSTEM TO PROVIDE QUALITY WORK 3 (2011), 
https://www.ndrn.org/images/Documents/Resources/Publications/Reports/Segregate
d-and-Exploited.pdf. 
 2. Faces of Olmstead, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.ada.gov/olmstead/faces_of
_olmstead.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2018) (containing a collection of personal stories 
of persons with disabilities following the June 2013 Interim Settlement Agreement 
between the Department of Justice and the State of Rhode Island and the City of 
Providence.) (“Under the agreement individuals will receive access to integrated 
supported employment and integrated day activity services, allowing them to become 
more active participants in the community.”). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
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boring and lamented the amount of downtime involved.5 Prior to the 
June 2013 Interim Settlement Agreement between the Department 
of Justice and the State of Rhode Island and City of Providence, 
Jerry believed spending his days in a sheltered workshop 
performing rote benchwork for less than minimum wage would be 
a life sentence.6 
Jerry’s story is not uncommon in the United States. According 
to a 2011 report by the National Disability Rights Network (NDRN), 
“[e]ven with the dramatic improvements in competitive 
employment, there remains three individuals in segregated day 
programs for every one person working in competitive 
employment.”7 In 2012, Goodwill Industries—Jerry’s post-
graduation sheltered workshop employer—reported employing 
more than 260,000 individuals with disabilities.8 The wisdom and 
legality of sheltered workplaces have increasingly been called into 
question. In response, this Note proposes the Department of Justice 
promulgate regulations to clarify if and when sheltered workshops 
are legal under Section II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 
1990 (ADA). Comprehensive regulations offer a better opportunity 
to clarify the policies underlying the act than does litigation. 
With the 1990 passage of the ADA, Congress intended “to 
provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the 
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.”9 
In the 1999 decision, Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, the United 
States Supreme Court held that the ADA stood for the proposition 
that people with disabilities have a right to live in a broader 
community alongside their non-disabled peers.10 However, 
Olmstead only prohibited the residential segregation of people with 
disabilities in residential institutions—not vocational segregation.11 
 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. (“I thought I would be doing benchwork my whole life.”). 
 7. NAT’L DISABILITY RIGHTS NETWORK, supra note 1, at 9. 
 8. Laura Walling, Goodwill Helps People with Disabilities Reach Their Full 
Potential, GOODWILL INDUSTRIES INT’L, INC., http://www.goodwill.org/blog/advocate/
goodwill-helps-people-with-disabilities-reach-their-full-potential/ (last visited Oct. 3, 
2018). Goodwill Industries “does not support the phase out or elimination of the 
Special Wage Certificate,” a certificate from the Wage and Hour Division of the 
Department of Labor that allows employers to pay workers with disabilities less than 
the federal minimum wage under Section 14(c) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 
U.S.C. § 214(c). Id. 
 9. CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATEMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 
JUSTICE ON ENFORCEMENT OF THE INTEGRATION MANDATE OF TITLE II OF THE 
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND OLMSTEAD V. L.C. 1 (2011), https://www.ada
.gov/olmstead/q&a_olmstead.pdf (quoting  42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)). 
 10. See Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 597 (1999). 
 11. See id. 
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With regard to the segregative nature of sheltered workshops, the 
NDRN, a nonprofit organization seeking federal support for 
advocacy on behalf of people with disabilities, has argued that: 1) 
segregated work and sheltered environments contradict national 
policy; 2) work segregation of people with disabilities is damaging; 
and 3) sheltered workshops lead nowhere.12 This Note argues the 
Department of Justice should promulgate regulations clarifying the 
appropriate application, if any, of such sheltered workshops—in 
particular, the Department of Justice should follow the lead of the 
Department of Education in promulgating regulations to the effect 
that persons with disabilities should be situated in the least 
restrictive environment appropriate to that person within the 
workplace. 
Though sheltered workshops have existed in the United States 
since at least 1840, their popularity exploded in the 1950s and 
1960s.13 Segregated workshops are “facility-based day programs 
attended by adults with disabilities as an alternative to working in 
the open labor market.”14 These workshops were designed to 
“enable men with severe physical impairments to contribute to 
society.”15 Sheltered workshops have drawn increasing scrutiny 
since the 2011 publication of the NDRN’s Segregated & Exploited: 
The Failure of the Disability Service System to Provide Quality 
Work.16 A number of persons with disabilities in Oregon have 
challenged sheltered workshops as violating Title II of the ADA, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 12131–12134, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).17 However, no such case has yet been 
decided on the merits—leaving the question open as to whether in 
fact such workshops do violate these provisions of federal law. In 
order to clear up this uncertainty, and to protect workers with 
 
 12. NAT’L DISABILITY RIGHTS NETWORK, supra note 1, at 15–27, 32–34. 
 13. Laura C. Hoffman, An Employment Opportunity or a Discrimination 
Dilemma?: Sheltered Workshops and the Employment of the Disabled, 16 U. PA. J.L. 
& SOC. CHANGE 151, 154 (2013). 
 14. Id. at 151. 
 15. Gena Rinaldi, Gimme Shelter?: Lane v. Kitzhaber and Its Impact on 
Integrated Employment Services for People with Disabilities, 22 AM. U. J. GENDER 
SOC. POL’Y & L. 749, 751 (2014). 
 16. See, e.g., id. (discussing the NDRN report that demonstrated hundreds of 
thousands of people remain segregated in sheltered workshops); Hoffman, supra 
note 13, at 151–52 (stating that the NDRN report brought greater attention to this 
issue). 
 17. See, e.g., Lane v. Kitzhaber, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1199 (D. Or. 2012) (involving a 
class action filed by eight individuals with intellectual or developmental disabilities 
alleging that the Oregon Department of Human Services violated Title II of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973 by unnecessarily keeping them segregated in sheltered workshops). 
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disabilities and employers alike, the Department of Justice should 
promulgate regulations that ensure: 1) workers with disabilities are 
not segregated from their non-disabled peers in the workplace 
where such segregation places these workers in a more restrictive 
environment than necessary; and 2) where segregated workshops 
are indeed in the best interest of workers with disabilities, their use 
is regulated to protect these workers. 
To that end, Part I of this Note discusses the history of 
segregation in the United States that led to the landmark 
Olmstead18 decision. Part II provides an overview of Title II of the 
ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and relevant 
precedent. Part III discusses the analogous case of the 
desegregation of educational settings along the axis of disability. 
Finally, Part IV discusses and recommends possible courses of 
action that the Department of Justice could pursue in promulgating 
regulations to adequately oversee the use of sheltered workshops. 
The continuing debates surrounding the benefits and detriments to 
relying on sheltered workshops, combined with the sporadic 
implementation of supported services approaches, creates an 
opportunity for guidance at the federal level through the 
Department of Justice’s promulgation of regulations that would 
instruct the states on the appropriate use and appearance of 
sheltered workshops. 
II. Background 
Sheltered workshops are “characterized by repetitive 
piecework, which has been subcontracted to the sheltered 
workshops by companies that never interact with the disabled 
employees performing the work.”19 This is at odds with the spirit 
and perhaps the letter of acts promoting community integration for 
persons with disabilities. The Rehabilitation Act of 197320 
“promoted the idea of community integration . . . identif[ying] one 
of its purposes as ‘promot[ing] and expand[ing] employment 
opportunities in the public and private sectors for handicapped 
individuals and to place such individuals in employment.”21 
 
 18. See Olmstead, 527 U.S. 581. 
 19. Susan Stefan, Beyond Residential Segregation: The Application of Olmstead 
to Segregated Employment Settings, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 875, 895 (2010) (citing 
ZANA MARIE LUTFIYYA, PAT ROGAN, & BONNIE SHOULTZ, CTR. ON HUMAN POLICY, 
SUPPORTED EMPLOYMENT: A CONCEPTUAL OVERVIEW (1988), http://thechp.syr.edu/c
hp-archives-supported-employment-a-conceptual-overview/). 
 20. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701–797 (2012). 
 21. NAT’L DISABILITY RIGHTS NETWORK, supra note 1, at 15. 
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However, a far greater level of protection for people with disabilities 
came in 1990 when Congress passed the ADA.22 The stated purpose 
of the ADA was: 
(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for 
the elimination of discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities; 
(2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards 
addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities; 
(3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role 
in enforcing the standards established in this chapter on behalf 
of individuals with disabilities; and 
(4)  to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including 
the power to enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate 
commerce, in order to address the major areas of discrimination 
faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.23 
However, with regard to sheltered workshops, the “national 
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals 
with disabilities” has been anything but “clear and 
comprehensive.”24 The provision of the ADA at issue in Olmstead25 
and here, found in Title II, reads: “Subject to the provisions of this 
subchapter, no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason 
of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the 
benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or 
be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”26 This provision, 
which clearly establishes that individuals with disabilities cannot 
be excluded from appropriate activities, does not directly address 
the creation of programs specifically for those with disabilities. 
The first case dealing with discrimination against people with 
disabilities preceded even the passage of the ADA—Homeward 
Bound, Inc. v. Hissom Medical Center.27 Homeward Bound “created 
principles and remedies that remain as alive and true today as they 
were over twenty years ago.”28 There, the court found that “all 
 
 22. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-33, 104 Stat. 327  
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012)). 
 23. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2012). 
 24. Id. 
 25. See Olmstead, 527 U.S. 581. 
 26. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2012). The definition of a “qualified individual with a 
disability”  is “an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable 
modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, 
communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and 
services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the 
participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity.” Id. at § 12131(2). 
 27. Stefan, supra note 19, at 883 (citing Homeward Bound, Inc. v. Hissom 
Medical Ctr., No. 85-C-437-E, 1987 WL 27104 (N.D. Okla. July 24, 1987)). 
 28. Stefan, supra note 19, at 883. 
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Hissom class members are to receive prevocational and vocational 
services commensurate with his/her need. This will necessitate that 
the State accelerate and perhaps redirect its efforts to create 
employment options for persons with severe disabilities.”29 
Following the passage of the ADA, in Olmstead,30 the Supreme 
Court interpreted this portion of the ADA to “require[] the removal 
of individuals with disabilities from institutional settings and into 
communities whenever possible.”31 Under Title II of the ADA, the 
Attorney General “shall promulgate regulations in an accessible 
format that implement [Title II, including 42 U.S.C. § 12132’s 
discrimination proscription].”32 One such regulation, the 
“integration regulation,” provides that: “A public entity shall 
administer services, programs, and activities in the most integrated 
setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with 
disabilities.”33 Another such regulation, the “reasonable-
modifications regulation,” provides: “A public entity shall make 
reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when 
the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis 
of disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that making 
the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the 
service, program, or activity.”34 In Olmstead, Justice Ginsburg, for 
the majority, found that the remedies appropriate for a violation 
falling under Title II of the ADA are those made available by section 
505 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.35 The Court held that, under 
these regulations, “[u]njustified isolation . . . is properly regarded 
as discrimination based on disability.”36 However, it also recognized 
that States need to maintain “a range of facilities for the care and 
treatment of persons with diverse mental disabilities, and the 
State’s obligation to administer services with an even hand.”37 This 
recognition of the segregation of persons with disabilities in housing 
as a form of discrimination based on disability flows directly from 
 
 29. Homeward Bound, WL 27104 at *38. 
 30. See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 581. 
 31. Hoffman, supra note 13, at 156. 
 32. 42 U.S.C. § 12134(a) (2012). 
 33. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (1998). 
 34. Id. at § 35.130(b)(7). 
 35. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 590 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12133) (“The remedies, 
procedures, and rights set forth in [§ 505 of the Rehabilitation Act] shall be the 
remedies, procedures, and rights this subchapter provides to any person alleging 
discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of section 12132 of this title.”). 
 36. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 597. 
 37. Id. 
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the language of Title II of the ADA.38 In prohibiting this form of 
segregative discrimination, Justice Ginsburg did not go so far as to 
apply this logic to segregation found in the workplace. 
Following Olmstead, however, plaintiffs with disabilities have 
filed multiple lawsuits to apply the logic of Olmstead to similar 
segregation in the workplace—especially in so-called “sheltered 
workshops.”39 In Lane v. Kitzhaber,40 eight individuals with 
intellectual or developmental disabilities who received employment 
services from the Oregon Department of Human Services (DHS) 
brought a class action against DHS and various state officials, 
including Oregon’s governor, the Director of DHS, and the 
Administrator of the Office of Developmental Disability Services, 
alleging violations of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act.41 Seven of the 
eight plaintiffs worked in sheltered workshops—“segregated 
employment settings that employ people with disabilities or where 
people with disabilities work separately from others”—and would 
have preferred to receive supported employment services “which 
would prepare and allow them to work in an integrated employment 
setting, which they define as a real job in a community-based 
business setting, where employees have an opportunity to work 
alongside non-disabled coworkers and earn at least minimum 
wage.”42 The court found that the case fell under the purview of the 
ADA because it involved “the state’s provision (or failure to provide) 
integrated employment services, including supported employment 
programs.”43 Therefore, the court denied the defendants’ motion to 
dismiss.44 The case settled soon thereafter, leaving the question of 
whether the law permitted sheltered workshops in any 
circumstances unanswered. 
However, others have suggested some benefits to sheltered 
workshops. For example, “they are safer alternatives to outside 
employment, they are less demanding for people with disabilities in 
terms of work and social skills, they provide greater opportunities 
 
 38. Id. at 600 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (“[H]istorically, society has tended 
to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities, and, despite some 
improvements, such forms of discrimination against individuals with disabilities 
continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem.”). See also 42 U.S.C. § 
12101(a)(5) (2012) (“[I]ndividuals with disabilities continually encounter various 
forms of discrimination, including . . . segregation . . . .”). 
 39. See, e.g., 841 F. Supp. 2d 1199 (2012). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 1199. 
 42. Id. at 1201. 
 43. Id. at 1202. 
 44. Id. at 1208. 
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for fostering friendships, they ensure structure during the 
weekdays, and they ensure assistance for life without affecting 
disability benefits.”45 While some states have largely moved toward 
supported employment services, others continue to rely primarily 
on sheltered workshops.46 
Opposition to the phasing out of sheltered workshops on the 
basis that they provide needed services for some individuals with 
disabilities misses the mark. In Olmstead itself, Justice Ginsburg 
found that “[t]he ADA is not reasonably read to impel States to 
phase out institutions, placing patients in need of close care at risk,” 
and that it is not “the ADA’s mission to drive States to move 
institutionalized patients into an inappropriate setting, such as a 
homeless shelter.”47 Here, the situation of sheltered workshops is 
analogous—the ADA should not be read to require an abolition of 
all placements in sheltered workshops, but rather to prohibit the 
over-utilization of such workshops where less restrictive settings 
are available and appropriate given the needs of the individual in 
question. This accords with the findings of the district court in Lane 
v. Kitzhaber,48 and with the logic of Olmstead in prohibiting the 
segregation of persons with disabilities except where such 
segregation is appropriate, as determined on an individualized 
basis. 
The Department of Justice has already begun trying its hand 
at applying Olmstead to the issue of sheltered workshops and 
whether such practices bring states out of compliance with Title II 
of the ADA. In 2012, the Department of Justice sent a letter to the 
Attorney General of Oregon, stating that: 
Title II of the ADA and Olmstead mandate that individuals be 
given the opportunity to be integrated into the community more 
than just by their mere transition into integrated residential 
settings. Rather, individuals with disabilities have the right to 
live integrated lives, by participating in all aspects of 
community life . . . .[T]housands of individuals still spend the 
majority of their day-time hours receiving employment services 
in segregated sheltered workshops, even though they are 
 
 45. Hoffman, supra note 13, at 164 (citing Alberto Migliore, Sheltered 
Workshops, INT’L ENCYCLOPEDIA OF REHABILITATION (2010), 
http://sphhp.buffalo.edu/rehabilitation-science/research-and-facilities/funded-
research-archive/center-for-international-rehab-research-info-exchange.html. 
 46. Stefan, supra note 19, at 930–31 (finding that New Mexico, Vermont, and 
Washington largely rely on supported employment services, while Idaho, Missouri, 
and Nevada continue to rely primarily on sheltered workshops). 
 47. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 604–05. 
 48. Lane, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 1204(“[P]articipation for persons with disabilities in 
sheltered workshops ‘must be a choice, not a requirement.’”). 
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capable of, and want to receive employment services in the 
community. Such unjustified segregation makes many of the 
benefits of community life elusive for people with disabilities, 
even though they are residing in the community.49 
The letter goes on to argue that “[w]ork is undoubtedly at the 
core of how most Americans spend their time, contribute as 
taxpayers, relate to society, and, importantly, access the full 
benefits of citizenship, including economic self-sufficiency, 
independence, personal growth, and self-esteem.”50 
Finally, in 2011, the Department of Justice interpreted the 
integration mandate “to include the corpus of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Olmstead, by specifically including integrated 
employment services as a remedy to unnecessary segregation in 
sheltered workshops.”51 This, in combination with the Letter to the 
Attorney General of Oregon, marks a shift in the stance of the 
Department of Justice on the legal status of sheltered workshops, 
integrated employment, and the integration mandate. However, 
because much remains unclear in the application of this mandate—
even given the recent trend of the U.S. Department of Justice 
toward encouraging integration—much is left to be desired in terms 
of federal guidance on this issue. The shortcomings of Department 
of Justice policy, and suggested alternatives, are discussed in Part 
III of this Note, following a brief discussion of the analogous 
situation of the “Least Restrictive Environment” doctrine arising 
from the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA),52 and 
a discussion on Minnesota’s “Olmstead Plan” as an example of a 
direction the Department of Justice could take. 
III. The “Least Restrictive Environment” Doctrine in the 
Educational Sphere 
Residential segregation is not the only sphere in which 
Congress and the courts have grappled with the relative autonomy 
of individuals with disabilities. Such debates have also been fought 
out in the context of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and 
 
 49. Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to 
John Kroger, Att’y Gen., State of Or. 2 (June 29, 2012), http://www.ada.gov/olmstea
d/documents/oregon_findings_letter.pdf (emphasis added). 
 50. Hoffman, supra note 13, at 174 (quoting Letter from Thomas E. Perez, supra 
note 49, at 3). 
 51. Rinaldi, supra note 15, at 755 (citing CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, supra note 9. 
 52. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. (2010). 
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Bill of Rights Act of 197553 and the 2004 IDEA.54  As far back as 
1975, the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights 
Act centered the discussion of the individual autonomy of persons 
with disabilities around the concept of “restriction.” In section 
6010(2), Congress stated that “[t]he treatment, services, and 
habilitation for a person with developmental disabilities . . . should 
be provided in the setting that is least restrictive of the person’s 
personal liberty.”55 However, this “least restrictive” requirement 
was not mandatory.56 In fact, the Supreme Court held that this 
“least restrictive” language “when read in the context of other more 
specific provisions of the Act, does no more than express a 
congressional preference for certain kinds of treatment,” concluding 
that this statute did not create any new substantive rights in favor 
of persons with disabilities.57 In 2004, Congress would finally make 
this “least restrictive” language mandatory under the IDEA.58  
However, as discussed in Part II of this Note, this language still 
remains unclear when it comes to issues of workplace segregation. 
In comparison, in Olmstead the Supreme Court held that the 
ADA’s proscription of discrimination requires the placement of 
persons with mental disabilities in community settings rather 
than in institutions when the State’s treatment professionals 
have determined that community placement is appropriate, the 
transfer from institutional care to a less restrictive setting is 
not opposed by the affected individual, and the placement can 
be reasonably accommodated, taking into account the resources 
available to the State and the needs of others with mental 
disabilities.59 
This marks a clear line of concern by the courts in preserving 
the liberty of individuals with disabilities from the educational 
sphere to the residential. The Department of Justice’s signaling of 
an interest in the overuse of “sheltered workshops” marks a foray 
into a third sphere—the occupational. 
 
 53. 42 U.S.C. § 6010(2) (1976), repealed by Pub. L. 106-402, Title IV, § 401(a), 
Oct. 30, 2000, 114 Stat. 1737. 
 54. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. (2010). 
 55. 42 U.S.C. § 6010(2) (1976). 
 56. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 599 (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp v. 
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 24 (1981) (concluding that the § 6010 provisions “were 
intended to be hortatory, not mandatory.”)). 
 57. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 19–20. 
 58. 20 U.S.C. § 1416(a)(3) (stating that the Secretary shall monitor the states in 
adequately measuring performance in the “[p]rovision of a free appropriate public 
education in the least restrictive environment”) (emphasis added). 
 59. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 587. 
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The IDEA “provides federal funds to assist state and local 
agencies to educate disabled children,” with eligibility for such 
funding conditioned on compliance with the Act.60  Under the Act, 
the segregation of children with disabilities into special education 
classes is appropriate only where the child’s disability is so severe 
as to “prevent[] her from being educated satisfactorily in a regular 
education classroom.”61 Under section 1412(a)(5) of the IDEA, this 
requirement that children with disabilities be provided with a free 
appropriate public education in the “least restrictive environment” 
is known as “mainstreaming.”62 Under this requirement, “school 
districts must teach disabled children and able-bodied children 
together to the maximum extent possible.”63 
In passing the IDEA, Congress found that: 
Disability is a natural part of the human experience and in no 
way diminishes the right of individuals to participate in or 
contribute to society. Improving educational results for children 
with disabilities is an essential element of our national policy 
of ensuring equality of opportunity, full participation, 
independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for 
individuals with disabilities.64 
Here, Congress establishes the IDEA as aimed toward, in part, 
the economic self-sufficiency of individuals with disabilities. 
Furthermore, improving educational results of those persons is 
portrayed as only one element for achieving this goal. To that end, 
one requirement imposed by the IDEA is the “least restrictive 
environment”: 
To the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities, 
including children in public or private institutions or other care 
facilities, are educated with children who are not disabled, and 
special classes, separate schooling, or other removal of children 
with disabilities from the regular educational environment 
occurs only when the nature or severity of the disability of a 
child is such that education in regular classes with the use of 
supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved 
satisfactorily.65 
This focus on restriction as a marker of the inclusivity of 
educational settings provides a lens through which the Department 
 
 60. Brian L. Porto, Application of 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(5), Least Restrictive 
Environment Provision of Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 
U.S.C.A. §§ 1400 et seq., 189 A.L.R. Fed. 297 (2003). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(1). 
 65. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A). 
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of Justice could examine and improve the lives of those disabled 
persons working in “sheltered workshops.” 
Limiting restrictions on individuals with disabilities can also 
have positive impacts on individuals without disabilities. In an 
evaluation of special education services in four elementary and four 
secondary schools in a large, metropolitan school district in a 
southwestern city, Dr. Lorna Idol found that teachers overall 
strongly supported the practice of integrating special education 
students into general education classes.66 In her study, Dr. Idol 
defined an inclusive school as one where “all students are educated 
in general education programs,” and defined inclusion as “when a 
student with special learning and/or behavioral needs is educated 
full time in the general education program. Essentially, inclusion 
means that the student with special education needs is attending 
the general school program, enrolled in age-appropriate classes 
100% of the school day.”67 In contrast, “mainstreaming” is a process 
by which “a student with special education needs is educated 
partially in a special education program, but to the maximum 
extent possible is educated in the general education program.”68  In 
terms of educators’ attitudes towards inclusion, “there was a trend 
among the participating educators of moving more and more toward 
the inclusion of students with disabilities in the general education 
classes,” and educators “had generally favorable impressions of the 
impact of students with disabilities on other students in their 
classes,” with the exception of exceptionally disruptive students’ 
behavioral problems.69 
Under the IDEA, the educational placement of a child must 
accord with the “least restrictive environment” requirement.70  In 
the Ninth Circuit, whether a child’s placement complies with this 
requirement is determined by balancing four factors: “(1) the 
educational benefits of placement full-time in a regular class; (2) the 
non-academic benefits of such placement; (3) the effect the student 
has on the teacher and children in the regular class; and (4) the cost 
of mainstreaming the student.”71  Here, the Ninth Circuit’s 
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balancing approach acknowledges the importance of both 
educational and non-educational benefits of mainstreaming 
students with disabilities, as well as the effect on non-disabled 
persons and the economic impact of mainstreaming. 
IV.  Minnesota’s “Olmstead Plan” 
Minnesota’s Olmstead Plan provides one example of a state 
embracing the Department of Justice’s attempted expansion of 
Olmstead to include the workplace. An Olmstead Plan is a “public 
entity’s plan for implementing its obligation to provide individuals 
with disabilities opportunities to live, work, and be served in 
integrated settings.”72 The Olmstead Subcommittee of the 
Minnesota Department of Human Services oversees Minnesota’s 
Olmstead Plan, following the Olmstead mandate.73 
The purpose of Minnesota’s plan is to “ensur[e] that people 
with disabilities experience lives of inclusion and integration in the 
community, just like the lives of people without disabilities,” and 
the plan envisions a society “where people with disabilities have the 
opportunity, both now and in the future, to live close to their 
families and friends and as independently as possible, to work in 
competitive, integrated employment, to be educated in integrated 
settings, and to participate in community life.”74 This reflects an 
acknowledgement of the inherent dignity of learning, living, and 
working in the broader community, and reflects the aims of the 
Department of Justice’s inclusion mandate. 
This Olmstead Plan, however, was not based on pure idealism. 
The State of Minnesota reached a settlement in a class action in the 
U.S. District Court in Jensen v. DHS, resulting in the modification 
of Minnesota’s Olmstead Plan.75  In Jensen, the court noted that an 
Olmstead Plan “must contain concrete, reliable, and realistic 
commitments, accompanied by specific and reasonable timetables, 
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for which the public agencies will be held accountable.”76  It further 
noted that, to be effective, a Plan must “demonstrate success in 
actually moving individuals to integrated settings in furtherance of 
the goals.”77 However, this approach leaves much to be desired. 
While a state-by-state litigation-focused approach, wherein the 
Department of Justice seeks settlement with each individual state 
to ensure compliance with its interpretation of the Olmstead 
decision, is useful insofar as it accomplishes integration on a local 
basis, a nation-wide regulation of sheltered workshops would 
enshrine the position that persons with disabilities deserve to live 
full lives in our society. This demonstrates a flaw in the use of 
Olmstead Plans as cure-alls in the struggle to phase out sheltered 
workshops—by shifting the struggle against segregation to 
individual states in a piece-meal, courts-based solution, hundreds 
of thousands of individuals with disabilities have been left behind. 
Instead, this Note advocates a national approach through the 
promulgation of regulations by the Department of Justice under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act. The particulars of this 
recommendation are laid out in Part VI of this Note. 
V. Policy Recommendations 
The Department of Justice should look to the regulations 
promulgated by the Department of Education relating to the IDEA’s 
“least restrictive environment” requirement.78 By borrowing from 
the Department of Education’s regulations concerning the least 
restrictive environments, the Department of Justice can look to the 
well-established case law on the issue.79 In fact, these regulations 
dovetail nicely with already-existing Department of Justice 
regulation 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d), which states that “[a] public entity 
shall administer services, programs, and activities in the most 
integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals 
with disabilities.”80 When compared with the Department of 
Education’s regulations concerning integrated educational 
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settings,81 it is clear that both agencies value the maximum possible 
integration between disabled and non-disabled individuals in 
various settings. However, in order to clarify the uncertain legality 
of “sheltered workshops,” the Department of Justice should follow 
the Department of Education in specifying that this integration 
mandate applies to both public and private institutions with regard 
to employment. By only applying this integration mandate to public 
services, the Department of Justice has shifted the burden of 
providing maximum possible integration onto plaintiffs, many of 
whom may lack the bargaining power or means to challenge their 
private employer. 
Thus, the Department of Justice should promulgate the 
following regulation, or something substantially similar: 
To the maximum extent appropriate, individuals with 
disabilities, including individuals in public or private 
institutions, are employed in a setting with individuals who are 
nondisabled; and separate environments, or other removal of 
individuals with disabilities from the regular occupational 
environment occurs only if the nature or severity of the 
disability is such that employment in the broader work 
environment cannot be achieved satisfactorily. 
By making explicit that the Department of Justice’s inclusion 
mandate applies to the private workforce, this regulation would 
clarify the significant ambiguity in the law left in the wake of 
Olmstead,82 as well as make the inclusion mandate consistent 
between the occupational and educational spheres. Unlike the 
IDEA, Title I of the ADA applies to private and public employers 
alike.83 
Finally, this approach accounts for critics’ contention that the 
abolition of sheltered workshops would invariably lead to denying 
persons with disabilities access to fitting working environments. 
The Olmstead decision “is not about forcing integration upon 
individuals who choose otherwise or who would not be appropriately 
served in community settings.”84 Rather, a clarification of the 
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legality of sheltered workshops—along with a concomitant increase 
in scrutiny on the widespread use of them as a cure-all—would 
ensure that sheltered workshop settings are used only for those 
persons for whom a cloistered environment is appropriate. For the 
time being, sheltered workshops are widely used. To clarify when 
such environments are legal is not to deprive those persons who 
truly need a sheltered environment an ability to work; instead, it is 
merely to ensure that each individual is given the resources he or 
she requires to live a full and dignified life. 
Conclusion 
In 1948, Professor Jacobus tenBroek, President of the National 
Federation of the Blind, spoke at the Banquet of the Annual 
Convention of the Federation. In that speech, Professor tenBroek, 
himself blind, said: 
A program of public assistance . . . must be so arranged as to 
leave the recipient’s independence unimpaired. He must be free 
to spend his grant as he pleases. He must be left to make his 
own decisions about where and how he shall live and what he 
shall do. He must have the divine election, so far as social 
existence and his own talents permit, of making the choices 
which determine his own worldly destinies, not without 
guidance, if he wishes it, but without intrusion, if he does not.  
Man does not forfeit the rights of individuality and the dignity 
of the person by economic necessity or physical handicap; and 
the injunction to be thy brother’s keeper is not an order to 
become his master.85 
His vision of a society in which persons with disabilities would 
be free of the humiliation of servitude is within reach. By 
promulgating regulations under the Americans with Disabilities 
Act, the Department of Justice could remove the stumbling block of 
segregation from the lives of persons with disabilities. By ensuring 
that all individuals are integrated into their respective workplaces 
to the greatest extent possible, the Department of Justice could 
bring us closer to Professor tenBroek’s dream, and closer to a more 
just society. 
Under the IDEA, students with intellectual disabilities are to 
be served in the “least restrictive environment” appropriate. 
Similarly, under Olmstead, persons with disabilities are to be 
housed in the “most integrated setting appropriate to the needs” of 
the individual in question.86 In the burgeoning debate over the 
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legality, and propriety, of “sheltered workshops,” and the 
accompanying legal ambiguity of those programs, the Department 
of Justice should look to both the regulations promulgated by the 
Department of Education and the Supreme Court’s mandates under 
Olmstead. In doing so, the Department of Justice should 
promulgate its own regulations under the ADA stating that 
workplaces that hire persons with disabilities should place those 
individuals in the least restrictive—or most integrated—setting 
possible in the workplace. This would leave open the possibility for 
the use of “sheltered” work environments for those individuals for 
whom an integrated workplace would be infeasible, while also 
cutting back on the widespread over-use of those workplace settings 
so criticized by groups such as the National Disabilities Rights 
Network. By fully integrating workers with disabilities into the 
mainstream employment sphere where possible, this approach 
would both reduce the stigma associated with disability in the 
workplace as well as truly enshrine the “right to live in the world” 
for persons with disabilities.87 
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